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[Below is the full text of the interim report on the elections in El Salvador released on April 29,
1994, by the US Citizens Elections Observer Mission (USCEOM). USCEOM brings together
representatives from over two dozen US-based legal, academic, religious and humanitarian
organizations working to promote the development of democracy in the hemisphere].
Under the leadership of representatives from Congress, religous figures, and scholars, the Mission
is independent and politically neutral. USCEOM had a total of 550 electoral observers present in 49
Salvadoran municipalities during the March 20 general elections.
In the April 24 runoff election, over 100 observers were present in nine municipalities.

Introduction
The US Citizens Elections Observer Mission (USCEOM) is an effort sponsored by more than two
dozen US organizations. We have been monitoring the Salvadoran electoral process since April,
1993, when a delegation including a member of Congress visited El Salvador to explore voter
registration issues in the context of the 1992 Peace Accords. Since then, the Mission has followed
the voter registration process, human rights issues, and the electoral campaign, culminating with
a concentrated presence in El Salvador during March and April, 1994, to observe the municipal,
legislative, and presidential elections processes.

Summary of Findings
The U.S. Citizens Elections Observer Mission congratulates the Salvadoran people for their patience
and perseverance in their efforts to exercise their right to vote. In the peace and democratization
process, these elections represent a step forward. At the same time, because they were marred by
excessive irregularities, they did not meet the standards of free and fair elections, and would be an
unacceptable model for the future.
The Mission documented, and proposed corrections to, those anomalies that most interfered with
the exercise of democratic rights in the March 20 elections. Unfortunately, the Supreme Electoral
Tribunal (Tribunal Supremo Electoral, TSE) did not fully implement recommendations made by
USCEOM or other international and national observer groups, and irregularities and instances of
fraud occurred again during the April 24 elections. Certain changes were made before the April
runoff, but these changes did not occur uniformly.
More importantly, the most fundamental structural problems were not addressed. In the short term,
it is vitally important to resolve the following issues: * reconsideration by the TSE of the challenges
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to the March 20 municipal elections that were presented by political parties; * constitutional reform
to restructure the judicial system and the TSE to make them professional, de-politicized, and
independent bodies; * electoral reform through the electoral code, which should be immediately
addressed in the new Legislative Assembly and is already being discussed by the political parties.
Reforms should include: * the creation of a single, comprehensive national registry of citizens to
replace the current electoral registry; * the use of a single national identity card for voting and
other purposes; * the institution of municipal governments with proportional representation; * the
establishment of a precinct system of voting. We encourage the international community, including
the United Nations and especially the US government, to support and encourage the Salvadoran
government in implementing these reforms, and in carrying out full implementation of the Peace
Accords.
Context

Peace Accords
In January 1992, the Salvadoran Government and the opposition Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) signed historic Peace Accords, ending the armed conflict and establishing
the framework to address the root causes of the war. Significant social, economic and political
agreements were reached; the implementation of many of those agreements is an important
contribution toward strong, continuing cooperation between the parties involved in the Peace
Accords. Many other equally important agreements have not yet been fully implemented. Land
reform and reinsertion programs for ex-combatants on both sides have not been completed, leaving
both residents of former conflictive zones and ex-combatants on the margins of society. Judicial
reform has not been implemented.
The National Civilian Police (PNC) has not been fully deployed; recently, serious concerns have
been raised about the incorporation of ex-security forces into the PNC. Violence and intimidation
attributed to the Armed Forces, security forces, and "death squads" continue to occur.

Electoral Structures
The 1994 elections were conceived by the Peace Accords not simply to select new political leaders,
but also to involve the political opposition, its supporters, and the previously marginalized
population. Unfortunately, the electoral process did not result in the level of democratic
involvement and participation anticipated for such a transitional election, intended to move the
country from war to peace. We recognize and applaud the good-faith efforts toward democratic
participation made by many members of the Vote Reception Boards and their municipal and
departmental counterparts. However, we observed that the structure of the Salvadoran electoral
system remains highly politicized, making it impossible to meet the full challenge of building a
democracy.
The right-wing ARENA and PCN parties dominate the system to such an extent that many reforms
already included in the Electoral Code were carried out insufficiently, or not at all. In the current
system, the ultimate electoral power resides in the TSE. There are five TSE magistrates, representing
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ARENA, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the PCN, and the CD, plus a fifth, "independent"
magistrate, the President (appointed by the Supreme Court), who consistently votes with the
ARENA/PCN block. The impotence of the TSE "Oversight Committee," and the role of the TSE
itself in fostering this impotence, strikingly illustrate the anti-democratic effects of such a politicized
structure. The electoral code establishes this committee, to which every political party has the right
to belong, in order to supervise the TSE. However, the Committee has no enforcement power, and
the TSE consistently has both ignored the Oversight Committee's recommendations and denied it
the due access necessary to oversee the Tribunal's work.
In addition to effectively neutralizing the Oversight Committee, the TSE has failed completely to
implement at least one other safeguard prescribed by the Electoral Code: the appointment of the
Electoral Auditor, who according to the electoral code is responsible for overseeing the financial,
legal and administrative functions of the TSE. The TSE's refusal to submit to oversight of any sort is
a particularly glaring example of how an uncontrolled, politicized body can operate arbitrarily even
as it speaks of democracy. USCEOM observed a variety of instances of arbitrary decisions which
were only possible either because authority was too concentrated in a single body or because no
consistent authority was established.
Convenience and expediency were favored over observation of a thorough, democratic process,
at the national as well as at the more local levels. For instance, the criteria for the final vote
count appeared to be speed (in some cases the parties relied upon their own, independent
computerized tallies) rather than compliance of the electoral code (which requires review of every
official municipal certificate). The transparency of the electoral system was compromised by the
unwillingness of some high level TSE and ARENA party officials to allow USCEOM and other fullycredentialed observers to monitor all parts of the process. For example, president-elect Armando
Calderon Sol publicly stated during his campaign that Salvadorans should "ignore" international
observers.
President-elect Calderon Sol's remarks suggest a reluctance to permit international observation
of future elections, which does not bode well for the transparency of Salvadoran democracy in the
future.

Human Rights.
The Salvadoran Peace Accords mandated reforms to improve human rights and end impunity.
However, human rights violations continue to occur. Indeed, during the first campaign period there
was a marked increase in apparently politically motivated assassinations of opposition leaders and
candidates on national and local levels. A series of serious human rights violations occurred since
our last report that tainted the atmosphere necessary for free and fair elections.
Some examples:
On the eve of the second round of voting, the National Police followed, detained, and threatened
Coalition member Isidro Aguilar of Apopa, San Salvador. They bound his hands behind his back
and accused him of being a guerrilla, telling him they were going to kill him. Aguilar's neighbors
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heard him screaming and came to the rescue. After 30 minutes of arguing with his neighbors, the
police retreated.
* The National Union of Workers and Farmers (UNOC), historically allied with the Christian
Democratic Party (PDC), stated that armed people searched their office, breaking into files which
contained names and addresses of their members.
* Luis Alberto Landaverde Portal, the PDC mayoral candidate from Ilobasco, Cabanas, was reported
missing as of April 14, when he had traveled to San Salvador. His family considers him to be
"disappeared." He told USCEOM observers in March that he was concerned about death threats
that he had been receiving, and that he believed he was being followed.
Tragically, the violence did not end with the termination of the second round. A Coalition Vote
Reception Board president in La Libertad was murdered on the night of the elections as he went
home after voting ended.

Voter Registration
As of May 1993, approximately 798,000 Salvadorans were unregistered, of a total voting-age
population of 2.7 million. The TSE calculates that 74,000 were unable to vote in March because
their birth certificates were not on file, and 160,000 were unable to vote in March because they had
not received their voter identification cards even though they were approved. In addition, United
Nations sources say that about 100,000 people turned away from the polls in March because of
confusion, inability to find their names on the list, and long waits. No mechanism was established
for absentee ballots, excluding over one million Salvadorans living abroad; and an estimated 60,000
youth who turned 18 years old between the November 20 cut-off date and election day were not able
to vote. The expansion of the voter registry between rounds was minimal.
According to Rafael Lopez Pintor, the head of the ONUSAL electoral division, only 12,000 of the
74,000 people who were previously denied voting identification cards for lack of birth certificates
were able to obtain them in time for the runoff. In addition, only 30,000 of the 160,000 who had not
received their voter cards by March were able to obtain them in time to vote on April 24. Many
people with newly attained voting cards did not find their names on the registry when they tried to
vote. According to a sampling in 26 municipalities conducted by the Social Initiative for Democracy
(a civic education organization) 50% of those who attempted to pick up their voter cards after March
20 were turned away.
The TSE told many citizens they would not be able to pick up their voting cards until after May 1. E.
Vote Counting Procedure. After the polls closed on March 20, USCEOM noted serious irregularities
in the vote counts. These irregularities were observed at all levels, from the "disappearance" of
ballot boxes and certificates to the TSE refusing to investigate challenges made by the opposition
parties. The following are a few of the anomalies USCEOM observed: * In San Miguel, ballot boxes
disappeared for hours after the polls closed. Witnesses reported that several senior ARENA officials,
including the mayoral candidate, brought ballot boxes and certificates from ARENA's headquarters
to the tally site, in clear violation of procedures established in the electoral code.
In San Salvador, the total number of municipal and legislative votes inexplicably exceeded the total
number of presidential votes by 40,000.
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* Electoral board members abandoned their posts, leaving ballot boxes unattended in San Salvador.
Also of serious concern is the TSE's treatment of challenges. Shortly after March 20, two opposition
parties formally requested re-votes: the FMLN, 37; the Unity Movement (MU), 7. ARENA asked
for one re-count, and the FMLN sought five. The TSE rejected without hearing all those made by
the opposition parties. But they accepted the single ARENA petition, held a hearing, and decided
that a re-count was justified. The ARENA mayoral candidate won the re-count. ONUSAL identified
at least seven cases compelling enough to merit further investigation, and asked to meet with the
Tribunal to discuss the legal basis for refusing to hold the hearings requested by the opposition. On
April 19, ONUSAL issued a statement that the TSE had refused to meet with them to discuss this
issue; on April 20, the TSE met with ONUSAL.
In response to expressions of concern by members of the US House and Senate, the US Department
of State inquired of the TSE how it intended to handle these petitions; based on their conversations,
the State Department reported to Representative (and USCEOM Co-chair) Dan Hamburg that the
Tribunal planned to investigate eight of the cases. As of this writing, the TSE has, to our knowledge,
reviewed none. When the final vote tally ended two full weeks after the elections, it revealed that
in the presidential race, ARENA candidate Armando Calderon Sol received just over 49% of the
popular vote. The second contender, Ruben Zamora of the Coalition, achieved 25%.
Because ARENA fell short of the constitutional requirement to take 50% plus one vote in order to
be declared a winner, a run-off election between the top two presidential candidates was scheduled
for the second time in El Salvador's history. IV. April 24, 1994 Voting Day Observations A. Serious
Irregularities and Instances of Fraud. On April 24, USCEOM field teams observed and received
reports of fraud and serious irregularities, similar to those observed by other missions.
Our observations included:
* In Mejicanos, San Salvador, "Jose" reported that he had been offered 15 colones (US$1.70) to vote
for ARENA by a man wearing an ARENA poll watcher vest. Jose told the man that voting was secret.
Jose was unwilling to give USCEOM his voting card number because he claimed it could put him in
danger, and added that ARENA only approaches "humble" people like himself. He said that later in
the day he saw a man in a car giving a stack of colones to another ARENA-vested man.
* People standing in line in front of City Hall in the city of San Miguel on April 25, told observers
they were waiting to receive roofing materials in exchange for votes cast the day before. * Alex
Munoz, mayor-elect of Ilobasco, Cabanas, was reprimanded and nearly arrested by the PNC for
"inducing people to vote for ARENA" by distributing food out of the party office on election day.
* Many cases of ARENA personnel voting twice or attempting to do so were witnessed. In Jucuapa,
Usulutan, ARENA Vote Reception Board alternate Jose Antonio Ramirez at booth #4205, was
accused at about 10:30 in the morning of voting twice. The TSE announced one arrest for doublevoting.
* At a voting center in Ilobasco, the political parties made an agreement in the morning that
armaments would be allowed inside, in spite of an electoral code prohibition and objections from
the PNC. Observers saw no clearly displayed weapons entering the center during the day, but felt it
was dangerous given the high level of tension.
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Human Rights Issues: Assassination, Intimidation, and Militarization
The runoff took place in an atmosphere of intensified emotions. The Vote Reception Board president
from Jicalapa, La Libertad, a Coalition member, was murdered on the night of April 24, on his way
home after the vote count. News reports said that Jose Isaias Calzada Mejia was attacked by three
armed men who shot him seven times and slit his throat. News accounts state that the victim had
several altercations with ARENA members during the day. By the time the murder was reported, the
ARENA mayor-elect of Jicalapa claimed in television interviews that he had received death threats
from the FMLN in response to the incident. Problems of intimidation were widespread.
In Nueva Trinidad, Chalatenango, USCEOM observers received reports that ARENA tried to keep
citizens from voting for the Coalition by spreading rumors that if the FMLN won, the FMLN would
kill the elderly, take away land and slaughter cows.
In Santa Rosa de Lima, La Union, Coalition leader Marcello Cruz attributed low poll watcher
turnout from his party to fear for personal safety. In interviews with factory workers from Ilopango,
San Salvador, observers learned that ARENA factory owners pressured workers to vote for ARENA.
Similar tactics were reported from a San Salvador factory, where wage increases were promised
if ARENA won, as well as by various public employees. Militarization continued to be an issue.
National Police frisked voters upon entering a voting center in Santa Ana City.
The inappropriate deployment of the Armed Forces along the highways and in the air throughout
much of the country on April 24 paralleled what we observed on March 20. On that date, their
presence was more visible than any other moment since the cease-fire began in February, 1992. The
Truth Commission Report noted that the army was responsible for 85% of the egregious human
rights violations during the 12-year civil war. It is understandable that voters would be intimidated
by military postures on election day, which violated the Salvadoran Constitution. In addition, our
observers in Jucuapa, Usulutan, received reports from voters that for several days the military had
been occupying two nearby towns, Villa El Triunfo and San Buenaventura, telling people not to vote.
Soldiers threatened people by saying that the military would get copies of the registry and "pay
them back" if they voted. C. Functioning of Polling Sites

Voter Orientation and Overall Process
USCEOM observers saw some improvements in the functioning of the Vote Reception Boards,
the opening and closing of the voting centers, transportation of voters, and the vote counting and
tallying process. However, these changes were not uniform. Illiteracy and disorganization continued
to be major problems, only somewhat alleviated by the provision of orientation teams. In Santa Ana
City, the teams were invaluable in helping voters. In two other municipalities where we observed,
Ilobasco and Santa Rosa de Lima, the orientation teams actually misdirected voters, increasing the
level of confusion.

Illegal Campaigning
Both parties participated in illegal campaigning at the voting centers on election day. This included
wearing party T-shirts with an "X" over party insignia indicating voting preference, which is
explicitly illegal in the electoral code; orientation teams handing out cards with party insignia to
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direct voters to their voting tables; and distributing party propaganda both inside and outside the
voting centers. USCEOM members reported much greater campaigning by ARENA party members,
which in addition to the above included handing out lunch bags and cups decorated with the
ARENA flag, identifying ARENA party members of the Vote Reception Boards; bracelets worn by
ARENA party members to identify them; and wide distribution of ARENA paraphernalia such as
T-shirts and flags in front of voting centers. Although such distribution of T-shirts and other items
may not be considered outright vote buying, it is certainly significant in a country where votes are
reported to be purchased for US$5, minimum daily wage is US$4 and a new T-shirt costs about US
$4.

Coalition Vote Reception
Board members in Mejicanos wore visors displaying party insignia. All of this activity violates
the electoral code, which strictly prohibits campaigning from Thursday through the voting on
Sunday and requires nondisclosure of the party identity of voting table personnel. 3. Ballot Secrecy.
Although some improvement was made in the second round, ballot secrecy continued to be
compromised by overcrowded conditions, poor location of voting tables, and in some instances
the intentional viewing of voters marking the ballots, sometimes by poll watchers. For example, a
USCEOM field team at the INFRAMEN voting center in the capital, at voting table #386, observed
that ARENA poll watcher Carlos Munguia commented to a fellow party member after observing
voters casting their ballots: "We are getting good results; they can stop voting now."

Electoral Lists
The electoral lists were recognized as a major problem in the March 20 elections, and the TSE
agreed to re-open the registry (the master list) in order to improve it. Nonetheless, USCEOM
field teams observed no significant improvement in the lists in the municipalities where we went.
Although in many cases the lists were displayed in a more organized fashion than before, and fewer
people actually were turned away, we did not find a significant number of names added to the list,
nor were other irregularities corrected. A number of cases were reported where voters who voted on
March 20 could not vote on April 24 because their names were no longer on the electoral list at their
polling place.
Many people found that despite their efforts to resolve registry problems since March 20, they still
were not able to vote on April 24. For example, USCEOM observers in Mejicanos, San Salvador,
interviewed a woman who tried to vote in 1989, 1991, March 20, 1994 and April 24, 1994 elections, and
was not able to exercise her right to vote in any election. She told the USCEOM observers that after
each election she went to the TSE to ask them to correct the list, and each time she was told either
that it would be corrected or that there was no problem.

The Roles of the Electoral Bodies
Although overall electoral institutional functioning was improved from the first round, some
municipalities continued to experience problems with the TSE. For example, USCEOM observers
in Jucuapa reported that the TSE did not fulfill their responsibility to provide the following: salaries
for the Municipal Electoral Board; training for the Vote Reception Boards; and funding for the
transportation of ballot boxes. Observers found that the Vote Reception Boards generally functioned
better, although most members still received no TSE training.
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Municipal Electoral Boards functioned better in a third of the places we observed, the same or worse
in the remainder. In the city of San Miguel, USCEOM observed that some Vote Reception Boards
were comprised exclusively of ARENA members, with only ARENA poll watchers, opening up the
opportunity for fraud. As ARENA mayor-elect Mario Valiente told USCEOM staff in a training
session, "If only one party is present, fraud will happen. The temptation is just too great."

Transportation
For the April 24 elections, the TSE approved transportation plans presented by ARENA, the
Coalition and a transportation union. Funds were provided by the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) with back-up funds from the US Agency for International Development
(USAID). This in itself is a significant improvement over March 20. However, transportation was
not consistently provided throughout the country. For example, the TSE did not provide any
transportation funds in Jucuapa, Usulutan, and in San Miguel (which is the third largest city in
El Salvador) the TSE did not provide transportation funds until 10:00 pm on the night before the
elections. ARENA was able to front funds and provide transportation, but the Coalition, without
access to dispensable funds, was not able to arrange for any transportation. In most cases where we
observed transportation functioning, it was highly politicized, with party flags flying and bus riders
singing party anthems. Salvadoran non-governmental organizations had criticized the politicization
of transportation and suggested it be handled through non-partisan channels.

Vote Count and Election Results
On April 24, USCEOM observers saw marked improvements over the first round at all levels of the
vote count process, in particular at the national level. USCEOM commends the TSE for correcting
the embarrassingly inefficient vote count process that followed the March 20 elections. Ninetyeight percent of the preliminary national tally was available the morning after the second round, in
contrast to the first round, whose preliminary count was aborted three days after the elections with
not even 85% of the count completed.
Even more impressively, the final count that took two weeks after the first round took just two days
after the second round. Some of this improvement is attributable to there being only one race rather
than three, and some of the speed resulted from the parties' mutual agreement to cut procedural
corners. Nonetheless, the TSE's strong efforts to streamline the counting process, particularly by
providing adequate resources to the Departmental Electoral Boards, were impressive.
At the local level, observers noted that the newly gained experience of the electoral officials resulted
in a generally more efficient and accurate process. Still, some instances of intimidation, dealmaking, and other irregularities marred the vote counting. During the vote count in Mejicanos, San
Salvador, for instance, observers reported 200 ARENA supporters chanting the ARENA fight song
at the entrance to the voting center, effectively blocking anyone from entering or leaving the center.
Some local officials displayed a tendency to resolve disputes by inventing rules, without regard for
the electoral code, creating many of the irregularities that observers reported.
The Municipal Electoral Board in Ilobasco, Cabanas provided a striking example of such
circumvention when, at 5:10 pm on election day, the Municipal Electoral Board secretary announced
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to the Vote Reception Boards that they were to seal the certificates within the boxes. When
USCEOM pointed out that this contradicted the electoral code, the president said that the Municipal
Electoral Board had made an independent agreement regarding the delivery of certificates. During
the municipal tally, the majority of sealed boxes were opened to retrieve the certificates, thus
violating security concerns as well as the electoral code.
Lack of materials (calculators, tables, and electricity) and inadequate training resulted in general
confusion at some voting centers, especially in the handling of certificates. This left the process open
to manipulation and potential security violations. The official results of the April 24 Presidential
race are as follows: ARENA won with 68% of the votes (818,264 votes); the Coalition attained 32%
(378,980).

Conclusions
The 1994 elections were the first held since the signing of the Peace Accords, in which new political
parties including the former guerrilla participated. As part of the peace and democratization
process, the elections represent a step forward. However, it is a step marred by serious irregularities
and, in some cases, technical fraud. Elections containing such institutionalized irregularities are an
unacceptable model for the future. Other observer missions have spoken of improvements in the
electoral process during the second round. We observed these changes. But we saw that the changes
were by no means uniform.
Improvements were not made in the fundamentally problematic areas: the exclusion of voters, the
electoral registry and the registration process. TSE improvements between March 20 and April
24 would not necessarily have altered the result of the presidential election. However, similar or
greater improvements before March 20 would have affected participation, and could well have
affected legislative and municipal results, in which the alliance between ARENA and the PCN
obtained a simple majority by one vote in the Legislative Assembly and where many city councils
were won by very small margins.
The Peace Accords intended that these elections play a key role in restoring Salvadoran people's
faith in their political system a faith vital to true democracy. Nonetheless, the TSE's actions
throughout the process have cast doubt on the neutrality of its aims. Far from building the
confidence of the Salvadoran people, politicization and incompetence on the part of the TSE have
clearly affected the process. A profound reform of the electoral code is crucial to build the general
public's confidence in the electoral process, which clearly was not strengthened by the recent
events.

Recommendations
As international observers, we are in the unique position of viewing the elections from an
outside and neutral perspective. It is this perspective which leads us to make the following
recommendations. We recommend that the US government urge the government of El Salvador
to take the steps listed below, and support the Salvadoran government as it takes these steps. Our
recommendations are intended to build on the structures that Salvadorans have designed, either in
Constituent Assemblies or in negotiations brokered by the United Nations. Our suggestions include
enforcing existing laws and accords as well as some reforms to the Constitution and the secondary
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laws of the country. We make them with great deference to the will of the Salvadoran people, and
with neither the desire nor the intent to interfere in the essential national decision-making process.
All of the recommendations to modify the Salvadoran Constitution must be passed by the current
Legislative Assembly before May 1, 1994. On that date, the newly elected Assembly will take office.
According to Salvadoran law, modifications to the Constitution must be passed by two concurrent
Assemblies. If this process does not begin immediately, then three more years, and another election,
must pass before those modifications can be implemented. Constitutional and Electoral Code
Reform and Implementation.
In order to decrease polarization, impunity, and voter exclusion, the electoral system must at a
minimum be reformed or enforced in the following ways:
A single, comprehensive national registry of citizens to replace the current electoral registry.
* A single, national identity card for both identification and voting purposes.
* Municipal governments with proportional representation. * A precinct system of voting.
* A simplified voting process.
* Prosecution for violations of the electoral code, particularly in the cases of traditional fraud, to
put an end to electoral impunity. Reforms Specific to the TSE. The role of the TSE is crucial to the
functioning of the entire electoral system.
In light of the apparently selective action and inaction by the TSE throughout the electoral process,
we recommend the following steps be taken:
De-politicize the TSE and other electoral bodies so that all magistrates and other officials be
competent and impartial professionals rather than political party representatives.
* Strengthen institutional oversight by implementing existing legislation to give power to the
Oversight Committee, include an appeals process, and appoint an electoral auditor.
* Institutionalize training for all participants in the electoral process.
Provide citizens with non-partisan transportation on the day of elections.

Peace Accords Implementation
The international community should continue to advocate full implementation of those Peace
Accord and Truth Commission recommendations which the current ARENA administration has not
yet fulfilled. Timely implementation is all the more vital since the elections failed to create inclusion
or build general confidence in the political system.
In particular, the following items are key:
Electoral and judicial reform.
* Incorporation of all ex-combatants into civilian life.
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* Land transfers and credit, as agreed to in the Peace Accords.
* Demilitarization of society through the strengthening and purification of the PNC, the complete
phasing out of the war-time National Police (PN), and the constitutionally mandated reduction of
the Armed Forces.

-- End --
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